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Abstract 
‘Post-truth politics’, particularly as manifested in ‘fake news’ spread by countermedia, 
is claimed to be endemic to contemporary populism. I argue that the relationship be-
tween knowledge and populism needs a more nuanced analysis. Many have noted that 
populism valorises ‘common sense’ over expertise. But another populist strategy is 
counterknowledge, proposing politically charged alternative knowledge authorities in 
the stead of established ones. I analyse countermedia in Finland, where they have played 
a part in the rise of right-wing populism, using a combination of computational and 
interpretive methods. In my data, right-wing populists advocate counterknowledge; they 
profess belief in truth achievable by inquiry, not by mainstream experts but alternative 
ones. This is a different knowledge orientation from the valorisation of ‘common sense’, 
and there is reason to believe it is somewhat specific to contemporary right-wing anti-
immigration populism. Populism’s epistemologies are multifaceted but often absolutist, 
as is populism’s relationship to power and democracy. 
Keywords: countermedia, Finland, gender, knowledge, populism, topic modeling 
Introduction 
Dramatic populist upheavals are now familiar in most Western democracies. A peculiar point 
of interest in these developments internationally has been so-called ‘post-truth’ politics, which 
allegedly takes an ambivalent relationship to the truth and bases itself on feelings and identity 
rather than fact (for example, Economist 10 Sep 2016, Guardian 15 Nov 2016). ‘Alternative 
news sites’ or ‘countermedia’ such as Breitbart in the US and Fdesouche in France have con-
tributed to the popularity of politically-charged ‘fake news’.  
Finland has been no exception; in fact, it is a forerunner. During the 2010s, Finland has seen a 
right-wing populist uprising in parliamentary politics (Arter 2010), online activism (Pyrhönen 




role. The anti-immigration scene was quickly consolidated after the 2008 founding of Hom-
maforum.org,1 an online forum for self-proclaimed ‘critics of immigration’. This led many ac-
tivists to join the right-wing populist Finns Party and contribute to the enormous 2011 success 
of the party (Ylä-Anttila & Ylä-Anttila 2015). Encouraged by the ‘migrant crisis’ from 2015 
on, several ‘countermedia’ websites2 sprang up, spreading politically-charged news, sometimes 
of questionable truth value. They have accused immigrants of serious crimes, mainstream jour-
nalists of covering them up, and politicians of facilitating a destructive assault on Finnish soci-
ety by immigrants. They combine facts with fiction and rumours, sometimes intentionally blur-
ring the lines or spreading outright lies, most often cherry-picking, colouring and framing in-
formation to promote a radical anti-immigrant agenda. Despite the mainstream media quickly 
calling them out as ‘fake news’, these websites became immensely popular, while street vio-
lence against immigrants intensified simultaneously and the government asylum policy was 
tightened. 
Thus, in Finland and elsewhere, it is more relevant than ever to study the linkage between pop-
ulism and the production and communication of knowledge. Populism claims to represent ‘the 
people’ against a ‘corrupt elite’ (Aslanidis 2015, Berezin 2009, Canovan 1999, Hawkins 2010, 
Jansen 2011, Kazin 1998, Laclau 2007, Moffitt 2016, Ostiguy 2009, Taggart 2000). However, 
most studies of this connection have focused on populism’s tendency to valorise experiential 
folk wisdom and ‘common sense’ while criticising expertise (Cramer 2016, 123–130; Hawkins 
2010, 7; Hofstadter 1962; 2008[1964]; Oliver & Rahn 2016; Saurette & Gunster 2011; Wodak 
2015, 22).3 Is populism categorically anti-intellectual, and does it always prefer common-sense 
                                                
1 ‘Homma’ (lit. ‘thing’ or ‘job’) comes from the somewhat obscure idiom ‘homma nousuun’, 
literally translated as ‘[let’s put this] thing onto an upward path/trajectory’, meaning roughly 
‘a toast to the advancement of our cause’. This is an ironic reference to historical Finnish neo-
Nazi leader Väinö Kuisma using this expression in the documentary film Sieg Heil Suomi 
(1994), in which Finnish neo-Nazis are presented in a rather unflattering light; as such the 
name of the forum is likely a piece of self-deprecating humor rather than a positive self-
identification with Nazism. 
2 The most popular of these is MV-lehti (‘WTF Media’), a right-wing populist countermedium 
founded by Ilja Janitskin, who is a suspect in multiple crimes and in police custody at the time 
of writing (October 2017). Others include Magneettimedia (‘Magnet Media’), a neo-Nazi 
news site originally started by businessman Juha Kärkkäinen; and a myriad of anti-
immigration blogs. These often share content with each other. 
3 My view of populism is to understand it as a cultural repertoire, a set of political tools 
(Swidler 1986; Lamont & Thévenot [eds.] 2000) which pit a valorised ‘people’ against a 
corrupt ‘elite’, rather than an as an overarching and coherent value-system such as an 
ideology (Aslanidis 2015; Brubaker 2017; Jansen 2011; Moffitt 2016; Ylä-Anttila 2017). As 
for argumentation, I understand it through the pragmatist sociological perspective of 
Boltanski & Thévenot’s justification theory (1999, 2006) as a communicative activity based 
on moral habitual practices which are not only discursive, but embodied and material. Despite 




knowledge, based on everyday experiences, to scientific arguments? This article shows, both 
theoretically and empirically, that counterknowledge, allegedly supported by alternative in-
quiry, is another salient strategy of questioning mainstream policies in a populist style, at least 
in my case of contemporary right-wing populism. An analysis of knowledge claims in Finnish 
anti-immigrant online publics, by computational and interpretive methods, reveals a multi-fac-
eted view: while often subscribing to fringe populist views, many anti-immigration activists 
nevertheless claim to hold knowledge, truth and evidence in high esteem, even professing 
strictly positivist views, and strongly opposing ambivalent or relativist truth orientations. These 
communities, consisting mainly not of career politicians but ordinary people using the tools of 
populism (Ylä-Anttila 2017), often employ ‘scientistic’ language and engage in popularisation 
of scientific knowledge and rhetoric. They mostly do not oppose expertise on the grounds of 
‘folk wisdom’ or experiential knowledge, as we might assume if applying the literature on pop-
ulism and knowledge to them (Cramer 2016, 123–130; Hawkins 2010, 7; Hofstadter 1962; 
2008[1964]; Oliver & Rahn 2016; Saurette & Gunster 2011). Instead, they advocate a particular 
kind of objectivist counter-expertise. For them, it is the ‘multiculturalist elite’ who are ‘post-
truth’. 
This article contributes to the study of populism and provides a more nuanced analysis of ‘post-
truth politics’. There are reasons to believe that counterknowledge is a primary strategy of con-
temporary anti-immigration radical right-wing populism. In contrast, the valorisation of expe-
riential ‘common sense’ in favour of expertise is more typical of rural populism, on which the 
‘epistemological populism’ literature is largely based (Hofstadter 1962, Kazin 1998). In this 
sense, this article also contributes to the ongoing discussion on the relationship between popu-
lism and the radical right (see Stavrakakis et al. 2017), by noting a possible divergence in the 
epistemological argumentation of these interconnected but distinct political modes.4 
Epistemological populism and counterknowledge 
A political epistemology that valorises ‘the knowledge of “the common people,” which they 
possess by virtue of their proximity to everyday life’, has been termed epistemological populism 
by Saurette & Gunster (2011, 199). Such a tendency to eschew experts in favour of ‘folk wis-
dom’ is a well-known tool of populism (Cramer 2016, 123–130; Hawkins 2010, 7; Hofstadter 
1962; 2008[1964]; Oliver & Rahn 2016; Wodak 2015, 22), while something similar has been 
identified in recent public debates in Europe over Brexit, and the presidency of Donald Trump 
in the US. It is now often claimed that ‘the common people’ have had ‘enough of experts telling 
them what to do’, and that it is the ‘common people’ who have access to practical knowledge 
via their everyday experiences, from which the experts have become estranged. But this is an 
                                                
argumentation theory, particularly the concept of endoxa (Van Eemeren 2010, 111) and 
Wodak’s (2015) framework of topoi, but this discussion will have to take place elsewhere. 




overly simplistic view of contesting epistemic authority (Harambam & Aupers 2014) in con-
temporary populist politics. 
While epistemological populism eschews expertise altogether and seeks knowledge in the 
‘hearts’ or experiences of the ‘common people’, I propose the concept of counterknowledge to 
mean contestations of epistemic authority by advocating alternative knowledge authorities. 
These two concepts, epistemological populism and counterknowledge, can be used for a more 
nuanced analysis of ‘post-truth politics’. In the case at hand, I ask whether Finnish online anti-
immigrant activists and countermedia employ epistemological populism, counterknowledge, or 
both. How do they use them, what does this tell us the about link between populism and 
knowledge, and ‘post-truth politics’ more broadly? 
Gosa (2011, 5) has usefully defined counterknowledge – in a very different scene, black Amer-
ican hip-hop culture – as ‘an alternative knowledge system ... challenging white dominated 
knowledge industries such as the academia or the mainstream press’. In Gosa’s case, artists and 
hip-hop fans try to explain experienced racial inequality in a political sphere that claims to 
adhere to racial equality by constructing ‘alternative knowledge’ about elite dominance. It is 
claimed, for instance, that successful black rappers (such as Jay-Z, Nas and Kanye West) are 
puppets of the Illuminati – that a Masonic plot of white supremacists has hijacked hip-hop to 
manipulate blacks and keep them subjugated, and blacks should ‘wake-up and reclaim hip hop 
as a tool of black empowerment’ (Gosa 2011, 9) and ‘question the information they regularly 
receive from school and the mainstream media’ (Gosa 2011, 12). The creation and dissemina-
tion of counterknowledge has political aims. This may seem like a leap from Nordic national-
ists, but Gosa notes that very similar epistemological argumentation can be used by right-wing 
counterknowledge: 
In this respect, my case of hip hop conspiracy theory is analogous to the 
Barack Obama conspiracy theories forwarded by the conservative Tea Party 
and the ‘Birther Movement.’ Since the 2008 election of Obama as the first 
black president of the United States, these groups have used Internet media 
to spread the rumor that Obama is a Kenyan-born Muslim, a socialist, and 
that he attended terrorist training schools in Indonesia during his childhood 
... these conspiracy theories are used by some whites to voice racial anxiety 
and concern over the shifting racial demographics of the country (Gosa 2011, 
15). 
Mosca and della Porta (2009) also note the creation and communication of counterknowledge 
as one way social movements mobilise, by creating epistemic communities to counter those of 
the establishment, and construct new identities. Thus, counterknowledge can be defined as al-
ternative knowledge which challenges establishment knowledge, replacing knowledge author-
ities with new ones, thus providing an opportunity for political mobilisation. What makes both 
‘epistemological populism’ and counterknowledge particularly usable for populist mobilisation 
is the fact that populism typically challenges the elite in terms of political power, while episte-
mological populism and counterknowledge challenge knowledge elites. These strategies both 




Knowledge in a social context  
Recent research in social psychology highlights the potential impact of such political strategies 
challenging mainstream knowledge, by showing that (alternative) knowledge authorities can 
easily overshadow any actual evidence in a social and political context. Firstly, people are un-
comfortable with gaps in causal narratives and tend to fill them with almost anything (Lewan-
dowsky et al. 2012a; 2012b), emphasising the cognitive importance of narratives. Moreover, 
we tend to believe knowledge claims that confirm our socially held world-views, rather than 
assessments of truth value (Bessi et al. 2015; Kahan 2010; Kahan et al. 2010; Kahan et al. 2011; 
Lewandowsky et al. 2012a; 2012b). Even corrections of clearly false information are rarely 
accepted if they are dissonant with peer group beliefs (Nyhan & Reifler 2010). If the results of 
a belief lead to political implications that run counter to what you and your peer group believe 
is ‘right’, those beliefs tend to be rejected even in the face of hard evidence (Lewandowsky et 
al. 2012a; 2012b). Moreover, knowledge that is relevant for politics is often social knowledge, 
which is ‘justified by contextually, historically, and culturally variable (epistemic) criteria of 
reliability’, which ‘implies that a community may use, presuppose and define knowledge as 
“true belief” what members of another community or period may deem to be “mere” or “false” 
belief, ideology, prejudice or superstition’ (Van Dijk 2014, 21). 
Sociology, on the other hand, has long since noted both the cultural bases of cognition (Brekhus 
2015) and the proliferation and deterioration of knowledge authorities in modern public 
spheres, which is a discursive opportunity for counterknowledge production, since most of our 
knowledge is acquired from others via discourse (Van Dijk 2014, 68, 141). Because we cannot 
live our lives based on self-researched evidence-based knowledge, we must rely on epistemic 
authorities (Baurmann 2007; Giddens 1991, 22; Levy 2007). Even though ‘the knowledge in-
corporated in modern forms of expertise is in principle available to everyone’ (Giddens 1991, 
30), not all have ‘the available resources, time and energy to capture it’ in all cases (Giddens 
1991, 30). If this is the case, ‘how do you choose which expert to believe?’ (Knight 2000, 24). 
Belief in ‘alternative knowledge’ is not mere irrationality, but something that results from the 
realities of modernity, particularly ‘ontological insecurity’ (Aupers 2012, 22). But to switch 
from believing traditional knowledge authorities to counterknowledge authorities is merely ‘a 
transfer of faith’ (Giddens 1991, 23). And through the deterioration of established knowledge 
authorities (Aupers 2012), questioning established knowledge in one field tends to reinforce a 
tendency to believe counterknowledge in other fields as well: ‘The more seriously conspiracies 
are taken, the less trust can be placed in the centres of authority. If conspiracy is everywhere – 
embedded in the churches, universities, government, banks, the mass media – then no 
knowledge promulgated by such institutions can be trusted’ (Barkun 1994, 249). 
The sociological understanding of alternative knowledge advocated here is in clear distinction 
from Thompson’s popular definition of counterknowledge as misinformation – knowledge that 
‘purports to be knowledge’ but ‘can be shown to be untrue’ (Thompson 2008, 2). Most alterna-
tive knowledge does not counter knowledge that is in fact (easily) falsifiable, at least by the 




(Bale 2007; Keeley 1999). Taken together, these insights suggest that ‘fact-checking’ has lim-
ited utility in public debates. Instead of truth value alone, the social origins, meanings and im-
plications of knowledge claims are crucial. In this work, I do not seek to confirm or falsify 
knowledge claims, but to study their political use. 
The sociology of conspiracy theory 
Conspiracism, or conspiracy theory, is by far the most commonly identified form of counter-
knowledge in connection with populism. It is a type of counterknowledge particularly suited 
for populist framing, because it posits that the common people are misled in secrecy by an elite 
– making conspiracism explicitly political in a populist fashion. The connection was most fa-
mously made in 1964 by Hofstadter, who defines the ‘paranoid style’ as ‘a way of seeing the 
world and of expressing oneself’, in which ‘the feeling of persecution is central, and it is indeed 
systematised in grandiose theories of conspiracy’, while ‘the spokesman of the paranoid style’ 
feels ‘righteousness’ and a ‘moral indignation’ (Hofstadter 2008[1964], 4). It is a Manichean 
outlook in that the world consists of good and evil, in perpetual combat – and as such, is very 
similar to the political outlook of populism (Oliver & Wood 2014). 
Understanding conspiracism sociologically, Fenster (2008, 1) defines it as ‘the conviction that 
a secret, omnipotent individual or group covertly controls the political and social order or some 
part thereof’ (Fenster 2008, 1). It carries a promise of redemption, much like populism (Cano-
van 1999): ‘anyone with enough fortitude and intelligence can find and properly interpret the 
evidence that the conspiracy makes available’ (Fenster 2008, 8). Conspiracy theories are, in-
deed, a particular view of democracy: ‘embedded within many conspiracy theories and their 
understanding of power [...] is a longing for a better, more transparent and representative elected 
government’ (Fenster 2008, 12). For Fenster, conspiracy theory is ‘an interpretive framework’ 
(Fenster 2008, 95) more specifically ‘a complex political and cultural rhetoric and means of 
seeing the world’ (Fenster 2008, 36). Conspiracism provides ontological security by explaining 
the unexplained (Nefes 2013), constructs a narrative attempting to ‘restore a sense of agency, 
causality and responsibility’ (Knight 2000, 21), or as Thompson (2008, 146) puts it: 
it is comforting to believe that a psychic can put you in touch with your loved 
ones, or that eating broccoli will prevent you getting cancer; it is oddly reas-
suring to know that apparently random acts of evil are being coordinated by 
a satanic conspiracy. The practitioners of counterknowledge teach us that the 
universe is not arbitrary, that things happen for a reason. 
Besides conspiracy theory being a ‘populist theory of power’ (Fenster 2008, 89), I would add 
that it is also a populist theory of knowledge. It proceeds from the assumption that ‘the truth is 
out there’ – that is, secret knowledge exists, withheld by the establishment, but attainable, as-
suming sufficient dedication. The elite holds not just secret power, but secret knowledge – 
which should be challenged, claims the conspiracist. In fact, the conspiracist raises herself to 
the position of an alternative knowledge authority, a true expert instead of ‘false experts leading 




that it longs for truth and liberation, its objectives are laudable, even though its methodology is 
often defective (also see Dixon 2012). 
Conspiracy theories tend to be supported by those cynical about politics in general (Miller et 
al. 2015; Swami et al. 2010) – particularly minorities and the underprivileged (Stempel et al. 
2007). This supports these theories’ role as counterknowledge salient for populist mobilisation: 
they are not mere rumours believed by irrational people, but alternative explanations which 
challenge the mainstream, providing political fuel. They often reverse the power-relations be-
tween the in-group and the out-group. Sapountzis & Condor (2013) show that Greeks who voice 
nationalistic sentiments against the Republic of Macedonia used conspiratorial arguments to 
present Macedonians as benefiting from an unjust secret international power game, claiming 
that they are in fact the oppressors and the Greeks the oppressed – when the mainstream under-
standing is the reverse (see also Koronaiou et al. 2015). A similar dynamic is reflected in fears 
of Islamisation and ‘feminisation’ in my analysis.  
All in all, ‘alternative’ orientations to knowledge seem to be integral strategies in populist pol-
itics. However, they may take many forms, not only ‘epistemological populism’, that is, valor-
isation of experience-based ‘common sense’ (Cramer 2016, 123–130; Hawkins 2010, 7; Hof-
stadter 1962; 2008[1964]; Oliver & Rahn 2016; Saurette & Gunster 2011). Another, less studied 
form is counterknowledge, in which alternative knowledge and authorities are proposed – 
sometimes in the form of conspiracy theory. 
Data 
As empirical material, I look at an anti-immigration countermedium founded in 2014 (MV-lehti, 
‘WTF Media’), widely considered by the mainstream media as a ‘fake news’ site and the most 
popular countermedia (YLE 16 Sep 2016), and the most influential anti-immigration online 
forum (Hommaforum; see footnote 1 on p. 2), both popular in the Finnish online public sphere 
(see Table 1). While the WTF dataset contains fewer posts because of the nature of the medium 
(only administrators can post), since it gets more views per post, the societal relevance of the 
two datasets is roughly comparable. Nevertheless, Hommaforum is not only larger as a dataset 





Table 1. Data. 





‘Mitä Vittua?!’ (‘What the 
Fuck?!’), anti-immigration 
populist countermedium 
founded in 2014 
800,000 weekly unique 
visitors; in top 20 of 
Finnish websites 
(Kaleva 2015) 
N = 13,497 news 







forum founded in 2008 
2 million weekly views 
(Hommaforum statistics 
2016), 10,000 
registered users, the top 
10 of which account for 
10% of posts 
N = 318,081 forum 
posts 
The data collection timespan for both was a full year during the most intense debates over 
immigration, ignited by the refugee crisis, from June 2015 to May 2016. As can be seen in 
Figure 1, the crisis was clearly visible as a peak in Hommaforum posts, whereas WTF has grad-
ually increased its activity, posting three times as often in May 2016 as it did in June 2015 (see 
Figure 2). 
 





Figure 2. Posts per month in WTF Media. 
Analysis 
Topic modeling (Blei 2012; Evans 2014; Meeks & Weingart 2012; Mohr & Bogdanov 2013) is 
a data-mining method associated with computational social science and the ‘big data’ move-
ment (Bail 2014; Lazer et al. 2009). In brief, it recognises repeating patterns of word usage in 
text. When used by humanities scholars, topic models are used to assess which ‘topics’ (themes) 
texts are ‘about’. But when word usage patterns are taken to be traces of social activity (Babones 
2016), and especially when we know the data contains texts about a particular theme, sociolo-
gists may interpret them as frames or other cultural constructs (DiMaggio et al. 2013, Levy & 
Franklin 2013, Ylä-Anttila, Eranti & Kukkonen forthcoming). The potential advantages of topic 
modeling are the ability to analyse larger datasets than would be practical manually; the explor-
atory, inductive, ‘grounded’ discovery of unexpected patterns; reproducibility; and the ability 
to quantify qualitative observations, such as the prevalence of a discussion. 
I use MALLET’s (Machine Learning for Language Toolkit, McCallum 2002) implementation 
of the most common topic modeling algorithm, LDA (Latent Dirichlet Allocation, Blei et al. 
2003), an unsupervised machine learning method, which means that the researcher offers no 




LDA [...] assumes that there are a set of topics in a collection (the number is 
specified in advance) [...] Terms that are prominent within a topic are those 
that tend to occur in documents together more frequently than one would ex-
pect by chance [...] each document exhibits those topics with different pro-
portions (DiMaggio et al. 2013, 577–578). 
In even more simplistic terms, the researcher gives MALLET a dataset of documents and the 
number of topics she wishes to find, which returns that number of word-clusters consisting of 
words which often occur in the same document. While interpreting conversations based solely 
on word frequency may seem crude, the word-clusters are surprisingly meaningful, as I will 
show. In this paper, I consider them to represent frames: particular ways, practices and habits 
of interpreting issues (Entman 1993, Nisbet 2009, Ylä-Anttila, Eranti & Kukkonen forthcom-
ing). Frames identify relevant themes and present interpretations of them, and as such, the same 
themes are often discussed in my data using different frames. There is clearly much thematic 
overlap in the frames labelled understanding, truth and beliefs below, but their framing differs. 
Both datasets were included in the same model to look for frames that may or may not be used 
in both (WTF and Hommaforum). I use a 200-topic model. Nearly all the 200 word clusters 
were distinct, recognisable frames in the data, which indicates good model fit – but most were 
about themes not directly relevant to the study at hand (for example: economic policy, football, 
motorcycles). After a qualitative examination based on the literature discussed above, I dis-
carded 186 frames, and selected and named 14 (see Table 2). Details on the modeling, selection 
and interpretation of data can be found in the methodological appendix. Next, I qualitatively 
analyse the selected Hommaforum threads (11 threads, 1,442 messages out of 318,081 total) 
and WTF posts (81 posts out of 13,497 total). In this research design, the topic model is used to 
select material for qualitative interpretation in a way that is more reproducible and less subjec-
tive than qualitative selection would be. The sample quotes were selected to be as representative 
as possible of the described frame, but only cover a fraction of the material used for the analysis. 
Of course, my analysis does not cover all arguments on these fora, particularly in the case of 
Hommaforum, which is a diverse community of people rather than a medium with a single 






Table 2. Selected frames in three named themes, their names as interpreted by the author, their 
top words translated from Finnish to English by the author, and their frequencies. 
	     
KNOWLEDGE     
truth (#73) understanding (#110) beliefs (#151) research (#163) academia (#186) 
truth (2028) understand (1278) believe (1385) research (1748) university (1786) 
conversation (1909) complete (710) actually (905) relate (752) professor (1167) 
media (1796) reason (681) realise (878) example (742) researcher (1029) 
opinion (1743) thought (542) understand (866) result (726) research (noun) (783) 
present (1546) problem (531) feel (759) effect (634) expert (447) 
claim (noun) (1527) reality (491) live (739) reason (595) helsinki (432) 
fact (1450) habit (467) reason (737) found (582) science (307) 
claim (verb) (1291) about (426) know (731) difference (554) political (282) 
try (1108) think (388) reality (709) often (538) research (verb) (261) 
speak (1076) belief (377) business (692) phenomenon (508) discipline (234) 
     
     
COUNTERKNOWLEDGE    
climate change (#7) medicine (#108) quantification (#133) intelligence (#162) wtf (#166) 
temperature (522) doctor (1241) amount (3171) intelligence (795) wtf (6506) 
degree (305) treatment (781) percentage (2668) race (508) newspaper (6394) 
rise (341) patient (695) number (2402) gene (457) mainstream media (1790) 
climate (322) disease (586) great (1566) evolution (445) story (1611) 
cause (303) hospital (577) last (1545) intelligent (441) media (1602) 
warm (288) illness (472) finland (1400) african (421) reader (1270) 
warming (260) medicine (438) statistics (1199) species (410) publish (1080) 
atmosphere (257) treat (421) calculate (1039) iq (363) ilja5 (1056) 
water (257) cause (397) part (908) test (348) write (1029) 
climate change (254) hiv (304) research (822) africa (345) finland (943) 
     
     
CONSPIRACY     
power (#11) jews (#37) mainstream media (#128) eurabia (#183)  
political (4203) jew (2656) media (5251) europe (3175)  
power (1970) israel (2072) journalist (4273) people (1030)  
politician (1690) nazi (419) story (3601) world (845)  
act (1361) palestinian (370) yle6 (2782) great (816)  
politics (1287) arab (273) article (2662) european (803)  
great (1200) palestine (262) news (2157) war (793)  
people (1043) holocaust (256) hesari7 (2066) new (731)  
benefit (962) israeli (254) newspaper (1501) power (691)  
leader (914) germany (249) read (1362) destroy (600)  
action (893) area (244) write (1227) country (556)  
                                                
5 Ilja Janitskin, founder of WTF Media. 
6 YLE is the Finnish national broadcaster. 





The model did not find frames the researcher could identify from the outset as dealing with 
experiential knowledge or ‘common sense’. This is a first sign that they may not be very prev-
alent in the data. However, it did find four frames dealing with knowledge more broadly; if 
valorisation of ‘folk wisdom’ suggested by the ‘epistemological populism’ literature plays a 
significant role in the discussions, it should be found here. First, identified by words such as 
‘truth’, ‘opinion’ and ‘fact’, the obviously epistemological frame of truth (#73, see Table 2) is 
salient both on WTF and Hommaforum. On WTF, the mainstream media are branded liars, as 
WTF identifies as a ‘truth medium’ (4 Nov 2015) instead of ‘fake news’ (as the mainstream 
media claims) because it has no journalistic limitations on what can be published, thus avoiding 
bias. To uphold truth, it is claimed, freedom of speech must be absolute: 
There is no partial censorship, it either exists or doesn’t ... Freedom of speech 
is democracy’s most important foundation, without it democracy doesn’t ex-
ist ... They don’t want to silence WTF Media because it’s lying, they want to 
silence us because we tell the truth they don’t want to hear (WTF Media, 4 
May 2016).8 
At the outset, it is evident that the framing of truth, here, looks similar to populist framing of 
power and democracy: all limitations by liberal-democratic institutions and mainstream media 
– checks and balances that are in place to protect minorities – should be lifted to uphold true 
freedom and democracy. More specifically, the absolutism on truth, particularly on Hom-
maforum, takes the form of an explicit empiricist-positivist philosophy of science and an ‘en-
gineer mentality’ in that truths about society are assumed to be accessible by scientific methods. 
These truths could be adopted for governance; but the multiculturalist-relativist hegemony and 
the corrupt research community prevents such work. This is exemplified in several quotes be-
low. A rationalist attitude could cut through the ‘lies’ of multiculturalists, who are accused of 
basing their arguments on feelings and moral relativism instead of empirical data. 
When statistics are published that the ‘musulmaniacs’ rape 17 times more 
than native Finns, they argue you shouldn’t publish statistics because some-
one might be offended (Hommaforum user, 30 Dec 2015). 
Rational, evidence-based thought is our weapon against opinions based on 
feelings (WTF Media, 22 Apr 2016). 
Perhaps not incidentally, several nicknames on Hommaforum, as well as self-reported profes-
sions, hint at a high percentage of engineers and other technical professionals, and more than 
80% of users are male (Hommaforum statistics 2016). Gambetta and Hertog (2016) have re-
                                                
8 All translations from Finnish by the author. WTF often re-publishes other sites’ posts 
verbatim, and does not always make this clear. I assume content nevertheless reflects WTF 




cently noticed that engineers are disproportionally represented among not only right-wing ex-
tremists but Islamist terrorists, and explain this with a mind-set that seeks order and hierarchy, 
often found among engineers.9 Perhaps not incidentally, such personality traits are more com-
mon in men than women (Gambetta & Hertog 2016, 141–146). In my data, blame for ‘dis-
torted’, ‘subjective’ and ‘biased’ views on truth is typically imputed to post-positivist social 
science, which is linked with the false belief – it is argued – that reality can be studied through 
texts. ‘Real’ knowledge could be found by ‘real’ science, which many contributors claim to 
represent and/or advocate, not common sense and certainly not the humanities. Interestingly, in 
this respect the activists studied here diverge strongly from the conspiracy theorists studied by 
Harambam & Aupers (2014), who were strongly critical of science precisely because its 
claimed material reductionism. In fact, many Hommaforum writers engage in specifically the 
kind of ‘boundary work’ that Harambam & Aupers identified and that their informants criti-
cised, protecting the perceived ‘purity’ of science from non-scientific (non-measurable) claims. 
Apparently, the reporter believes there is no reality outside texts and words; 
that words, like spells, change the reality to what he wants (Hommaforum 
user, 8 Feb 2016). 
Frame #110, labelled ‘understanding’ and marked by the words ‘to understand’, ‘cause’, 
‘thought’ and ‘reality’, discusses understanding of reality in terms of social construction and 
cognitive bias. These were claimed to make anti-racists unable to see the negative effects of 
immigration. Many take the position that leftists and cultural liberals are blinded by their cul-
tural relativism, which makes them unable to understand ‘the objective truth’. The frame con-
nects understanding with mass media, their reliability, and freedom of speech: if the media are 
biased and freedom of speech limited, how can an accurate view of reality be formed? Hom-
maforum contributors and WTF Media accuse multiculturalists of a dishonest and flawed un-
derstanding of reality. 
Attitudes towards refugees are an excellent example of how cognitive bias 
affects people. The tendency to skate over all negative consequences is a bias, 
in which one thinks one’s own impression is based in reason (Hommaforum 
user, 19 Nov 2015). 
This claim of a biased understanding of reality is strictly limited to the political opposition, who 
are allegedly blinded by their ideology – inhabiting a false consciousness (Van Dijk 2014, 141). 
Harambam & Aupers (2017) have studied conspiracy theorists, who deflected accusations of 
conspiratorial thinking by claiming that others are the real conspiracy theorists, and only see 
evidence of conspiracies everywhere they look, whereas they themselves are in fact capable 
critical thinkers. Here, similarly, discussants are overly confident in their own rationality and 
conversely dismissive of the rationality of the political opposition. The argument is based on 
social psychological studies of cognitive bias, but not extended to cover the possible cognitive 
                                                
9 See also van der Waal & de Koster (2015) in this journal, who claim that education tends to 




bias of the immigration critics themselves. In such messages, the contributors are building and 
strengthening their own epistemic community, one which has particular criteria of validity for 
knowledge, which are considered superior to others (Van Dijk 2014, 21, 144, 147–152). 
The repression of [the multiculturalists’] own ideological rotten evilness is 
often caused by cognitive dissonance so deep they can’t fight it any other way 
than to stigmatise others as ‘evil’ and dismiss their opinions (WTF Media, 16 
Feb 2016). 
The frame of beliefs (#151) is surprisingly focused on gender, even though this was not appar-
ent from the top words. Women (and particularly gender studies) are blamed for non-positivist 
and non-rational worldviews resulting in detrimental policy (immigration). Many Hom-
maforum messages claim that women are irrational in their beliefs and make detrimental im-
migration and multiculturalism possible by relying on feelings and ‘common sense’ instead of 
reason. Hommaforum users particularly brand feminism, gender and ethnicity studies as inco-
herent madness because of their claimed lack of empiricist-rationalist logic. 
In 2016 we are seeing in all its brutality what happens when the woman gives 
up her natural role as homemaker and mother, and starts channeling her car-
ing instincts and weak prognostic abilities towards primitive Arab men 
(Hommaforum user, 8 Mar 2016). 
Many posts in frame #163 (research) represent a kind of citizen science, where writers frame 
politics through research and research through politics, while at the same time denouncing ac-
ademic research that has political aims. Contributors argue that proper research could provide 
arguments in favour of their own political views, such as showing that Muslims and Somalis 
are prone to commit rape and avoid paid work, but immigration researchers are corrupt and 
misled by their ideology. 
Fem... I mean gender studies’ favourite argument is that outsiders cannot have 
the expertise to comment on the quality of their research. Only those patting 
the backs of gender studies scholars do. There are scientific disciplines in 
which that actually applies (as well as specialities of engineering; I don’t 
think there are more than a hundred people in the world who understand the 
specialty I myself work in), but many ‘humanities’ have, after being politi-
cised, become totally indefensible (Hommaforum user, 18 Feb 2016). 
[In a discussion about a social-psychological study on how immigrant iden-
tities are ‘negotiated’ within societal structures] Is a Somali rapist somehow 
‘negotiating’ with society? ... That’s just abstract poetry, how can you get a 
PhD in that (Hommaforum user, 19 Feb 2016). 
Predictably, in frame #186, academia is framed as a corrupt insiders’ club and academics por-




The claims of ideologically and politically biased researchers are wrong and 
have been proven as such, which discredits their distorted and deceitful stud-
ies (Hommaforum user, 17 Feb 2016). 
Universities produce such ‘top-class experts’ as sociologists of celebration 
(this guy was presented as an expert on TV), researchers on light pollution 
(one of whom I personally know), scholars of the migration of ants and others 
you’d expect to find only in comic books (Hommaforum user, 4 Feb 2016). 
While the quotation above echoes a general distrust of academic expertise, I did not find exam-
ples of valorisation of common sense or personal experience in either Hommaforum or WTF 
Media. While this does not mean they do not exist at all, what can be said is that they are not 
very common. On the contrary, WTF articles and Hommaforum posts voiced heavy reliance on 
evidence in knowledge claims, but often not the same evidence as used in the mainstream me-
dia, or at least not the same interpretations of it. 
Counterknowledge 
I will now move on to discussions that were tentatively identified as likely locations for coun-
terknowledge production. The climate change frame (#7) consists largely (but by no means 
solely) of denialism and takes place mostly on Hommaforum, on which there is a 120-page 
debate on this subject. Both denialists and ‘alarmists’ reference a myriad of facts and measure-
ments to support their arguments, and the discussion is largely technical in nature. In contrast, 
the WTF posts on climate change are unanimously denialist and reflect a more overtly political 
stance, even moral condemnation of climate change mitigation, rather than the more technical 
framing on Hommaforum. 
Surface stations ‘observe’ more warming than in the troposphere, several 
times more in fact. According to radio sensors, for almost 60 years the trop-
osphere didn’t warm at all even though CO2 levels increased. Thus, the an-
thropogenic global warming theory remains a theory (Hommaforum user, 31 
May 2016). 
The climate hoax is a crime against humanity (WTF Media, 1 Nov 2015). 
The medicine frame (#108) mostly comprises WTF posts on alternative medicine, such as the 
supposedly cancer-curing effects of baking soda and how ‘Big Pharma’ attempts to suppress 
this information. Interestingly, many Hommaforum contributors have strong views on alterna-
tive medicine and condemn it as ‘quackery’ and ‘pseudoscience’ – consistent with the dominant 
empiricist-positivist epistemological stance on the forum. WTF’s infatuation with alternative 




Even the most aggressive cancerous tumours have been eradicated with the 
help of baking soda (WTF Media, 30 Jul 2015). 
We’re not talking about a serious news site here. Cancer is a kind of fungus 
cured by baking soda, yeah right (Hommaforum, 8 Nov 2015). 
A distinct frame (#133) encompasses quantification: framing various policy areas in terms of 
numbers and statistics. Most often this relates to immigrant crime, especially rape statistics, and 
the over-representation of immigrants in them. The mainstream media and authorities are ac-
cused of covering up this issue, and WTF and other countermedia praised for reporting them 
truthfully. It is true that the mainstream media utilises safeguards against stigmatising minori-
ties, for example, not mentioning the immigrant status of criminals unless it is deemed pertinent 
to the case. Justified or not, these are portrayed as ‘sugar-coating’ and/or ‘cover-ups’ by the 
radical populist right, who claim such practices distort the public’s view of immigrant crimi-
nality. Indeed, the dominant epistemology on Hommaforum claims that statistics can be taken 
as accurate descriptors of reality ‘as is’. This highlights how counterknowledge is not neces-
sarily ‘lies’ or ‘fake’, but an alternative framing of known facts, claimed to be the only true one. 
The usage of quantitative measurements on Hommaforum is not often used to hide overtly racist 
expressions, as is sometimes the case in politics, when extreme positions are framed in technical 
language to make them more acceptable. Instead, overtly racist positions are seemingly justified 
by statistics: 
In 2014 there were 713 suspected rapes in Finland, and since they estimate in 
the US that 65% of sexual assaults are not reported, the total number would 
be 1177 using the same percentage. There are more niggers in the US than 
we have thus far, so that percentage can be considered indicative at best 
(Hommaforum user, 30 Jun 2015). 
In a similar vein, frame #162 concerns whether Africans have lower intelligence scores than 
Northern Europeans and Americans, whether this is the cause of African poverty and migration, 
and whether this should affect immigration policy. Engaging in citizen science to produce coun-
terknowledge, these contributors spend considerable time in lengthy debates over this issue, 
citing studies left and right. Hommaforum is far from unanimous on this: many are highly crit-
ical of claims that Europeans have higher IQ’s or that IQ matters. However, those who believe 
that IQ is relevant claim it is an objective basis for racism – another example of a technical-
rational frame. 
Intelligence testing is a fully neutral and objective yardstick for filtering those 
who attempt to enter the country. We can’t read their thoughts, but we can 
measure their brain capacity. And it only takes ten minutes (Hommaforum 
user, 9 Jan 2016). 
One contributor, particularly critical of the general tone of the thread, is quoted below at length 
because of his/her remarkably accurate take on so-called ‘discussion board science’, making 




The book IQ and the Wealth of Nations is a typical inspiration for ‘discussion 
board science’. It has been claimed again that pro-immigration people have 
been scientifically proven wrong and the integrity of their research is com-
promised by their ‘unscientific liberalism’ ... Where has this ‘proof’ been 
found? That’s right, on discussion boards ... The hallmarks of ‘discussion 
board science’ include a general scientism: a compulsion for ‘scientific proof’ 
and the emphasis on how ‘science’ has ‘proven’ this and that, even though 
such an attitude is wholly alien to actual scientific research. Misunderstand-
ings on the possibilities and limits of science, reducing complex moral issues 
to ‘scientific’ yes/no experiments ... and a refusal to believe how difficult and 
often futile it is to apply scientific findings to societal questions (Hom-
maforum user, 18 Feb 2016). 
Frame #166 lets us see how Hommaforum talks about WTF Media.10 The reception is mixed, 
with some condemning WTF’s ‘obvious’ neo-Nazism and apparent political connections with 
Russia, using these connections to frame it as unreliable. Many praise WTF for ‘saying what 
others won’t’; even though much of the information might be bogus, some of it is correct and 
not available elsewhere. The participants emphasise that the same scepticism should be felt 
against mainstream media and countermedia, and that smart media consumers can assess infor-
mation themselves, without gatekeepers, like a rational homo economicus on a marketplace of 
ideas. The ideal rational individual (who, at least implicitly, is male) can make decisions himself 
and does not need the ‘nannying’ of media gatekeepers and watchdogs (who are often portrayed 
as women, see Hellman & Katainen 2015). Posts exhibit an absolutist view on freedom of 
speech: even if they condemn WTF’s overtly anti-Semitic and conspiracist content, they are 
prepared to fight for its right to publish it. This is reminiscent of the populist framing of power: 
full and absolute liberty would result from ‘true’ rule of the people, which could be realised if 
only the corrupt authorities be removed.  
Conspiracy 
When discussing power and its locations (#11), both Hommaforum users and WTF posts often 
use a conspiracist logic; however, some Homma users are also critical of conspiracism. The 
elite, which is claimed to hold true power in society behind the scenes, comprises of – among 
others – socialists, who have since the fall of the Soviet Union teamed up with capitalists, and 
formed ‘the Euroviet Union’ (Eurostoliitto, a term possibly coined by Timo Soini, the long-
term chairman of the right-wing populist Finns Party, see Soini 26 Apr 2010; WTF Media 10 
Apr 2016). They ‘control the mass media’ (WTF Media 22 Feb 2015), thus controlling society 
                                                
10 In turn, WTF does not hold a very favourable view of Hommaforum. On 30 Apr 2015, they 
posted that Homma has been ‘killed’ by their ‘hypocrisy’ and ‘liberalism’ after Homma 
moderators had censored some of WTF writers’ messages, thus not adhering to full and 
absolute freedom of speech. On 6 Apr 2016, WTF labeled Hommaforum founder Matias 
Turkkila ‘a mole’ and an enemy of the anti-immigration movement because of his recent 
marriage with Finnish Broadcasting Company journalist Sanna Ukkola, who had earlier been 




through the production of ‘consensus reality’ (WTF Media 31 May 2016). They have enabled 
supposedly destructive mass immigration through their ‘elite plan’ (Hommaforum user, 29 Mar 
2016). 
A hierarchic organisation can achieve great power and spread the agenda of 
a small top elite efficiently ... it is imperative that this organisation is secret 
since the common people cannot know who pulls the strings ... the primary 
channel of furthering this agenda is organisations such as the Bilderberg 
group, the Trilateral commission and CFR (Council of Foreign Relations). 
Another channel is local freemason lodges (WTF Media, 4 Jan 2016). 
A gender framing also figures prominently in connection with the power frame, as the ‘softness’ 
and permissiveness of society, manifested in multiculturalism and immigration, is claimed to 
result from a ‘feminisation’ of society advanced by the inclusion of women in politics. Women 
in some posts are said to be those holding power as ‘feminism has gone too far’: 
Politics, the judicial system, the bureaucracy, the media, the hostility and be-
littlement of our own men by our women. This is all because of feminism 
gone too far. Muslim mass immigration is only the symptom, feminism is the 
disease (Hommaforum user, 1 Jun 2016). 
More often, however, women are portrayed as ‘useful idiots’ who make the social liberal agenda 
possible because of their essential biologically-determined caring and compassion; they are be-
ing duped by the elite because they cannot participate rationally in politics: 
In the multiculturalist siege, women are mostly so-called useful idiots rather 
than the ones to blame because multiculturalism is mostly advanced by cyn-
ical old men with their own selfish interests and for that the softness of 
women is an apt tool. Women buy the media sob stories about dead kids in 
the Mediterranean (Hommaforum user, 4 May 2016). 
The WTF posts in frame #37 on Jews represent classic anti-Semitic conspiracy theory – Jews 
are in control of much of society, the Holocaust did not happen, and so on: 
Jews have throughout history been connected to organised crime – usury, hu-
man trafficking, narcotics and corruption (WTF Media, 25 Nov 2015). 
However, Hommaforum posts mentioning Jews are much more varied: only some posit anti-
Semitic attitudes, whereas many frame their views with sympathy for the historical plight of 
the Jewish people and are especially supportive of modern-day Israel. Some Hommaforum us-
ers also were quick to condemn any theories about Jewish global dominance as conspiracist 




Here’s a new interesting documentary worth watching on Jews [Posts link to 
anti-semitic documentary film on Youtube] (Hommaforum user, 18 June 
2015). 
The merits of the maker of that ‘documentary’ include conspiracy movies on 
chemtrails and fluoride. I bet that’s real high-quality investigative journalism 
(Hommaforum user in reply to previous, 19 June 2015). 
‘Media’, ‘journalist’, ‘story’, and the names of several Finnish mainstream media outlets mark 
frame #128. The media is largely discussed from a conspiracist perspective on both Hom-
maforum and WTF Media: it is claimed to be on the leftists’ side; publishing lies about nation-
alists and censoring the truth about immigrants under the false ideology of ‘political correct-
ness’: 
‘Mainstream media’ has for good reason become an unsavoury concept in the 
eyes of the citizens. It works in the interest of the political and economic elite 
by systematically lying to the public about political projects dear to its heart, 
such as forced multiculturalism and the European Union (WTF Media, 5 Mar 
2016). 
Finally, frame #183 is about the Eurabia thesis: the conspiracy theory that European elites are 
secretly plotting to Islamise Europe through mass immigration, by weakening European culture 
and the European gene pool. According to the posts and articles here, the EU was founded by 
a conspiracy-leading freemason Austrian Jew who wanted to destroy European peoples by mix-
ing Asian and ‘Negroid’ blood into the European bloodline. For at least a century now, a secret 
society of Marxists, anarchists, Jews and Freemasons (who some claim are led by George So-
ros) have been advancing their plot to destabilise and ultimately destroy European societies to 
create a New World Order, and multiculturalism is just a tool in this project. Again, a gender 
frame is surprisingly apparent: women are being used by the elites, because they are easily 
controllable and led by their emotions. A narrative emerges from these posts, both on WTF and 
Hommaforum, of a secret cabal trying to create a new pan-European race that would be more 
easily controlled than ‘pure’ Europeans. This is also why immigrants ‘do not get deported or 
even convicted of rape’ according to WTF Media (21 Mar 2016). African and Middle Eastern 
immigrants raping European women is allegedly part of the plan to make the European gene 
pool more easily controllable by introducing less intelligent genetics. This is an all-encompass-
ing conspiracy theory par excellence: 
The New World Order championed by the American billionaire David Rock-
efeller and the Bilderberg Group, the combination of capitalism and authori-
tarianism, is coming [...] The Muslim conquest of Europe is a prologue for 
the destruction of Europeans (WTF Media 21 Mar 2016). 
Discussion 
I have studied framing of knowledge, counterknowledge and conspiracism in a large set of anti-
immigration online discussions and ‘alternative news’ in the Finnish public sphere – one which 




The discussions on conspiracy revealed the ‘usual suspects’: Jews, Freemasons, Communists, 
the Bilderberg Society, bankers, multiculturalists, the media, the political left, and other elites, 
in various combinations depending on the writer, plotting in secret to take over the world while 
taking advantage of ‘useful idiots’ such as women in the process. While some of these claims 
are outlandish, it is not very useful to dismiss conspiracist framing as madness, considering its 
widespread popularity in contemporary society. Instead, it should be understood as an absolutist 
orientation to power and democracy, one which divides the world into good and evil – just like 
populism – and an absolutist epistemological frame; one which claims most people are ignorant, 
and true knowledge hides behind the smoke and mirrors. Such interpretations of power cur-
rently carry immense weight politically. However, eagerness for ‘proof’ of the conspiracy’s 
existence leads to glossing over any conflicting information, and an assumption that every clue 
is connected to the greater conspiracy, an attitude tuned to find proof of nefarious agency. 
The clear-cut difference between right and wrong, those who are ‘in the know’ vs. the ‘sheeple’ 
(Harambam & Aupers 2014, 474) helps to explain why the discussions analysed here so often 
espoused an empiricist-positivist philosophy: conspiracy theory is an absolutist frame of 
knowledge just as populism is of power. Rather than embracing an ambivalent or relativist 
stance towards truth, as suggested by the ‘post-truth’ thesis, or a stance based on first-hand life 
experiences as more valuable than expertise (Saurette & Gunster 2011), the right-wing populists 
studied here instead generally endorse radical scientism. Their strong beliefs about using (sta-
tistical) science to arrive at truths about society, and to use these truths to manage societies 
‘objectively’ and ‘rationally’, is their way of building an opposition between themselves – sup-
posedly not only morally but epistemically right – and the ‘misguided’ elite, in a populist fash-
ion. As crystallised in a final example from the data discussing Jussi Halla-aho, a right-wing 
populist blogger and leading anti-immigration activist figure: ‘He uses only unambiguous facts 
and draws conclusions directly from them. [...] Doing so always results in a text that is indis-
putable’ (Hommaforum user, 25 Mar 2016). In this thinking, multiculturalists do not just have 
the wrong opinions, they are delusional about reality. 
Furthermore, discussants connect this rationality, the ability to arrive at truths via empirical 
observations and logical reasoning, with the male gender. The realm of conspiracy theory is 
male-dominated (Ward & Voas 2011) and conspiracists self-identify as critical thinkers (Ha-
rambam & Aupers 2017). Indeed, conceptions of gendered rationality seem to play a large role 
in communities which centre around claims of critically engaging widely-accepted truths. This 
is most acutely visible in the recent politicisation of the ‘manosphere’ (Lilly 2016), a movement 
of online anti-feminism, which often self-identifies around a conspiracist metaphor of ‘the red 
pill’ (which the protagonist of the sci-fi film The Matrix has to take in order to ‘wake up’ to the 
real world rather than living in false consciousness). In fact, overlap between the ‘manosphere’ 
and the male-dominated anti-immigration ‘alt-right’ is likely significant and merits further 
study. 
To reiterate, whereas populists have often been identified as critical of intellectuals and techno-
crats (Cramer 2016, 123–130; Hawkins 2010, 7; Hofstadter 1962; 2008[1964]; Oliver & Rahn 




advocate a type of counterknowledge – a kind of ‘objectivist’ technocracy based on alternative 
knowledge authorities. This understanding should help us make more nuanced analyses of so-
called ‘post-truth politics’ and populist epistemologies: alternative knowledge strategies can 
indeed function as populist tools, not only as simple anti-intellectualism but a multitude of crit-
ical strategies including a defence of positivism and empiricism. In its absolutism, this kind of 
counterknowledge fits well with the populist Manichean frame of politics: opponents are 
deemed to be wrong not only in terms of morals, or knowledge, but in their view of what con-
stitutes knowledge in the first place, that is, their epistemological premises about the world. 
What it does not fit so well with is populism’s focus on ‘the common people’, from which its 
often-identified anti-intellectualism stems. 
Indeed, future research on knowledge and populism should assess whether various populist 
movements tend to use different knowledge constructions. It seems plausible that the strong 
emphasis on counter-expertise found in this article is a feature of the particular media studied: 
an anti-immigration discussion board and a countermedia news site, which strategically focus 
on opposing dominant discourses on multiculturalism, and are produced by activists with apti-
tude and skill in information technology and communications. Such an activist profile is fairly 
typical of contemporary radical right-wing populist movements, which often employ online 
communications in their strategies. On the other hand, the roots of populism are in anti-mod-
ernisation rural movements (see Kazin 1998), for which it is quite plausible to assume that 
valorisation of ‘folk wisdom’ is more typical (Cramer 2016, 123–130; Hawkins 2010, 7; Hof-
stadter 1962; 2008[1964]), and of which there are still strong echoes in contemporary populist 
movements including Trumpism and the Finns Party (Oliver & Rahn 2016, Ylä-Anttila 2017). 
Many contemporary right-wing populist movements are amalgams of populism and nativism. 
Their views and strategies regarding knowledge are affected by their specific combination of 
these repertoires. As such, studying populist knowledge-production provides a promising ave-
nue to further understanding populism in general. Populists are not just ‘post-truth’; different 
populisms seem to have different truth orientations. The particular correlations between types 
of populism and types of truth orientations are a matter for future empirical work. 
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Methodological appendix 
This methodological appendix clarifies some details about the process of creating and interpret-
ing the topic model. 
Firstly, the data for any computational text analysis must be pre-processed into a machine-read-
able format. That entails scraping the relevant text (in this case, from web pages) and tokenisa-
tion, in that all punctuation and special characters must be removed so that the data only con-
tains one word per line (a token). Also, stop-words must be removed: function words such as 
articles and prepositions which are not meaningful on their own. Finally, in the case of a highly-
inflected language such as Finnish (words are modified with suffixes to express grammatical 
categories), the tokens must be lemmatised, returned to their dictionary forms, so that 
words such as luen, luet, lukee (‘I read, you read, she reads’) are recognised by the computer 
as instances of the word lukea (to read). I scraped and tokenised the dataset using the Beautiful 
Soup library in Python (Beautiful Soup 2017), removed a custom list of stop-words for Finnish 
(available at https://populistknowledge.wordpress.com/), and lemmatised the data using 
the FinnPos toolkit (Silfverberg et al. 2015). 
How should the number of topics be chosen? There are two main approaches: a quantitative 
and a qualitative one (see Chang et al. 2009). Since my study is of a mixed-methods bent, I 
used both quantitative and qualitative methods in choosing the topic count as well. 




given the model we created? This measure is shown in Figure A1 for models of 150, 200 and 
250 topics, each with 256 iterations of the model. 
Also shown are models with two different MALLET settings regarding hyperparameter opti-
misation. In brief, hyperparameters affect the distribution of topic probabilities, since optimis-
ing them between iterations of the model lets some topics ‘weigh’ more (as is natural in text 
collections, some word-clusters being more prevalent than others). This generally improves 
model fit by enabling the model to include marginal topics, not just those associated with the 
most-used words, but can also go too far. High variance in topic probabilities creates models 
that comprise mostly of these relatively rare topics, missing more general trends (Schöch 2016). 
 
Figure A1. Model fit with different topic counts and MALLET hyperparameter optimisation 




This leads us to the importance of qualitative work, the quantitative measure of model fit being 
meaningless if the model does not help in interpreting the data. As Figure A1 shows, in this 
data, topic counts of 150, 200 and 250 give an increasing log-likelihood number for model fit 
(measuring how likely it is that the model would generate the data), but increasing the topic 
count also means diminishing returns from topic modeling, as the researcher must interpret a 
larger number of word clusters. Hyperparameter optimisation also clearly gives a better model 
fit here, letting the topics reflect both more and less prevalent discussions in the data. 
Since I am interested in potentially marginal discussions as well, I selected the model incorpo-
rating hyperparameter optimisation. Qualitatively, looking at the word lists, this created a larger 
number of relevant topics for my research design, whereas without hyperparameter optimisa-
tion the topics were too general.  The model fit likelihood measure was also better quantita-
tively. As for topic count, I qualitatively compared the top words of the 200- and 250-topic 
models and noted that the same topics of interest were present in both models. Thus, despite 
the 250-topic model having better model fit likelihood, I selected the 200-topic model to make 
the qualitative work somewhat less laborious (with hyperparameter optimisation, centre marker 
on the solid top line in Figure A1). 
After running the model, the qualitative interpretation starts with the selection of relevant top-
ics. We have previously documented a suggested procedure for this (Ylä-Anttila, Eranti & Kuk-
konen forthcoming). In a nutshell, I first use the lists of top words per topic (in this case, the 
top 20 words) to identify a preliminary label for the topic. If one cannot be distinguished based 
on the top 20 words, the topic is discarded as not coherent enough. If one can be distinguished 
but seems irrelevant for the research question, the topic is discarded as irrelevant. In this first 
phase, 17 of 200 topics were selected and the rest discarded – overwhelmingly because of ir-
relevance, not because of lack of coherence. Almost all 200 topics clearly represented a distinct 
frame, indicating good model fit. Word lists in Finnish for all 200 topics are available online at 
https://populistknowledge.wordpress.com/ 
In the next step, I read through the top 10 documents (posts) for each of the 17 topics selected 
to check if they matched the preliminary label assigned in the previous step. In all 17, all 10 top 
documents matched the preliminary label, but three topics were identified in which almost 
every message was by a single author. This revealed that these word clusters were not actually 
formed from a socially shared frame but because of the idiosyncratic vocabulary of one prolific 
author. These three were discarded, leaving 14 frames for qualitative interpretation. 
This selection of topics and their interpretation is of course to an extent subjective – but less 
subjective and more reproducible as a typical human-coded qualitative study of texts, since the 
classifications themselves are only based on measurable patterns, co-occurrences of words, ra-
ther than interpretation. I argue that this makes it a ‘best of both worlds’ approach, combining 
some of the quantitative measurement and reproducibility of computational methods with the 
sociological interpretation of qualitative analysis, with the former lending credibility, robust-




With regard to framing theory, which underlies the approach I have taken, it needs to be noted 
that rather than a sophisticated understanding of frames as non-conscious interpretive schemata 
used in face-to-face interaction, including non-verbal cues, in the vein of Goffman (1984), a 
computational method based on texts and word counts like used here is clearly not tenable. 
Instead, frames are understood here as implied linkages between two concepts present in texts, 
in which the other concept provides an interpretive frame for the other (see Ylä-Anttila, Eranti 
& Kukkonen forthcoming; Entman 1993; Nisbet 2009). 
